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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a traffic stop that took place during the early morning hours of 
September 9,2006. On the day and time in question, the Appellant Mr. Gilbert Livas ("Livas") 
was traveling West on the outbound connector, headed to the Eagle Road exit. Officer White 
stopped Livas for traveling 60 miles per hour in a 55 mile an hour zone. After approaching 
Livas' window, Officer White expanded the scope of his investigation from a traffic stop to a 
DUI investigation. Livas was thereafter cited with misdemeanor DUI. Livas' case was assigned 
to Judge William Harrigfeld. 
On October 10,2006, Livas filed a Motioll to Suppress on the basis that Officer White 
unconstitutionally expanded the scope of an otherwise legal traffic stop; moving to exclude all 
evidence obtained after that unconstitutional expansion. The hearing on Livas' Motion to 
Suppress was held on December 11,2006. Judge Hanigfeld entered an Order denying Livas' 
motion on December 27,2006. Within a week, Livas filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The 
hearing on that motion was held on February 16,2007. On March 30, 2007, Judge Marrigfeld 
entered an Order denying that Motion for Reconsideration. 
On May 2, 2007, the Court issued a Notice of Trial Setting, scheduling the trial of the 
case for Juiy 24,2007. 
On May 24, Livas filed a Motion to Dismiss under Idaho Code 5 19-3501(4) on the basis 
that his case had not been brought to trial within six months of his not guilty plea. Judge 
Reardon denied that motion from the bench on June 22,2007. 
On July 3 1,2007, Livas filed a Notice of Appeal of Judge Reardon's decision and the 
case was assigned to Judge Cheri C. Copsey. 
Oral argument was heard by Judge Copsey on March 27,2008. Judge Copsey entered 
her Decision on Appeal on April 2,2008, and on May 20,2008, Livas filed his Notice of Appeal 
of that decision with this Court. Through this appeal, Livas is asserting error only on the issue 
pertaining to the Magistrate and District Courts' ruling on his Motion to Dismiss. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court erred in affirming the decision of the Magistrate Court, which 
held that because Mr. Livas filed a Motion to Suppress, he effectively applied to postpone his 
trial, thereby waiving his right to speedy trial as provided in Idaho Code $ 19-3501 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate Court's Denial of Livas' 
Motion To Dismiss. 
1. Motion To Dismiss And Standard Of Review. 
The standard of review applied to a denial of a motion to dismiss is the same stand of 
review applied to a summary judgment ruling. Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 141, 91 1 P.2d 133, 
137 (1996). "After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving 
party, we will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated." Id. That is, if there is no issue of 
material fact, whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Gibson v. 
Ada Cozinry, 142 Idaho 746,752, 133 P.3d 1211, 1217 (2006). 
2. Applicable Law. 
Idaho Code 5 19-3501 provides in relevant part that, "the court, unless good cause to the 
contrary is shown, must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed . . . [i]f a defendant, 
charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is 
not brought to trial within six(6) months from the date that the defendant enters a plea of not 
guilty with the court." Idaho Code 5 19-3501(4). Under this statutory provision, defendants 
charged with misdemeanor offenses are given additional proteciion beyond what is required by 
the United States and Idaho Constitutions. State v. Brooks, 109 Idaho 726 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with the State, not the Defendant. State v. 
Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 16 P.3d 931 (2000), dealt 
squareiy with the issue of what constitutes a "good cause" determination under Idaho Code 
3 19-3501 for the delay ofthe trial by the State and, specifically, whether that inquiry incliides an 
analysis of the factors enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
In Barker, the United States Supreme Court chose to adopt a flexible approach to 
assessing whether the right to a speedy trial has been unconstitutionally denied, which 
"balancing test" includes consideration of the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, 
whether the defendant asserted the right to speedy trial, and the prejudice to the defendant. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
In Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court held, "[ulpon careful consideration of the relevant 
authorities, we believe that a thorough analysis of the reasons for the delay represents the 
soundest method for determining what constitutes good cause. We therefore conclude that good 
cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the 
delay" of the trial. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d 936. TheIdaho Supreme Court went on to 
find that theBarker factors should be considered, if at all, only insofar as they bear on the 
sufficiency of the reason itself. Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335, (Iowa 1980)). 
Following its decision in Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that holding in State 
v. Young, 136 Idaho 113,29 P.3d 949 (2001). "Good cause means that there was a substantial 
reason for the delay that rises to the level of legal cause." Id. at 116, 29 P.3d at 952. "The 
analysis whether good cause exists should focus upon the reason for the delay, and whether there 
is a substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Id. Of course, i t  is 
self-evident the legal excuse for the delay must be made by the State, as the burden to bring the 
defendant to trial is with the State. 
In Clark, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the magistrate court erred by 
improperly denying Clark's motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights under Idaho 
Code 5 19:3$1(3), where the court had granted a continuance beyond that statutory limit 
without a showing of good cause by the State. The Court held that neither "witness 
unavailability" nor a congested court calendar constituted good cause under the statute. 
In Young, supra, the State attempted an interlocutory appeal from the district court's 
order granting Young's motions in limine, which excluded certain evidence that would have 
allegedly corroborated the victim's testimony. The Idaho Supreme Court found: ( I )  there was 
no evidence that the State's appeal was frivolous; (2) the State had a right to interlocutory appeal 
under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(c)(7); (3) the public interest was served in the ability of a party to 
review the exclusion of evidence; and (4) if the evidence was erroneously excluded and the 
defendant acquitted, he could not be retried. Based on those factors, the court held that there was 
good cause and a legal excuse for the state's delay in bringing the defendant to trial 
3. The State's Case Against Livas Should Nave Been Dismissed. 
As set forth above, Livas entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a speedy trial on 
September 14,2006. Livas at no time waived his right to a speedy trial. Livas should have been 
brought to trial no later than March 14, 2007. Only on May 2, 2007 (nearly 8 months following 
the entry of his plea of not guilty), the Court issued aNotice of Trial Setting, scheduling the trial 
of the case for July 24,2007, ten months following Livas' plea of notguilty. 
During the hearing on Livas' Motion to Dismiss, the State argued that goodcause existed 
to relieve the State from its burden to bring Livas to trial within 180 days because any delay was 
attributable to Livas. R., Vol. I., j,7 00107, Exhibit 7, TR2, p. 9, LL. 8-14. In sum, the State 
argued that Livas did have a trial set within 180 days of his not guilty plea, as Judge Harrigfeld 
had originally set the case for jury trial for December 12,2006. Id., 15-16. But because Livas 
filed a Motion to Suppress, that trial setting was vacated, i.e. it was Livas' "fault" that he did not 
have a trial within the time frame set forth in Idaho Code § 19-3501(4). Id., p. 2, LL'. 1-5. 
Judge Reardon agreed with the State in ruling on and denying Livas' motion from ihe 
bench. Judge Reardon held that the original trial was "postponed upon [Livas'] application." 
Id., p. 12, LL. 17-18. 
Judge Reardon went on to hold: 
He certainly has a procedural right to bring a suppression motion 
when there's a constitutional violation alleged, but I'm not aware 
of any case law that extends or shortens the time -hamstrings the 
State, essentially, under 19-3501, by the exercise of the 
defendant's procedural right to bring a motion. 
Defined otherwise, it would seem to me, would open the door for 
defendants in all cases simply to file motions that had the effect of 
extending the proceedings beyond the defendants speedy tnal, and 
then claiming the rights of speedy trial was violated. 
R. Vol. I., p. 00107, Exhibit 5, TR2, p. 12, L. 20 - p. 13, L. 6. 
Judge Reardon then discussed the "second prong of the inquiry" that trial was not: 
"delayed or postponed upon [Livas'] application effectively. And I 
believe it was. And ~f I were to find otherwise, I think that there is 
good cause given the delay and the fact that 1 haven't heard 
anything about prejudice. There has been no conversation about 
how this has affected the defendant's right to receive a fair trial 
And I think for ail those rezsons, I don't think dismissal is 
appropriate under those circumstances. I am going to deny the 
motion. .  . 
R. Vol. I., p. 00107, Exhibit 5, TR2, p. 14, LL. 7-18. 
Judge Reardon's ruling was in error. 
In the "Decision on Appeal" entered by Judge Copsey, she affirmed Judge's Reardon's 
ruling and the rationale on which it was based. Judge Copsey found that "[iln denying the 
Motion to Dismiss, the Magistrate ruled in the alternative. First the Magistrate found that by 
moving to suppress evidence from the traffic stop and by moving the Court to reconsider its 
denial of the Motion to Suppress with supplemental briefing . . .. Livas' own actions caused the 
trial to be set out ofthe statutory requirements. In other words, the Magistrate ruled that the trial 
was postponed upon his application." (R. Vol. I, p. 00098). Judge Copsey went on to find that 
"[s]econd, in the alternative, the Magistrate found that there was good cause to set Livas' trial 
outside of the speedy trial date and that Livas identified no prejudice." Id 
Finally, Judge Copsey rationalized that because Livas' counsel included the following 
statement in briefing, that Livas walved his statutory speedy trial rights: 
In the event the Couii denies this Motion for Reconsideration, and 
does not disturb its Order of December 27,2007, denying Mr. 
Livas' Motion to Suppress, Mr. Livas requests that the Court stay 
this case in the event he determines to appeal the Court's ruling to 
the District Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.2. 
(R. Vol I, p. 0096). 
With regard to the latter "waiver" issue, the State never argued that this statement was in 
effect, a waiver by Livas. This line of "argument" was raised only by Judge Ccpsey, and for the 
first time in the Decision on Appeal. Further, it is a red herring proposition. It is the equivalent 
of Livas saying, "if you deny the motion and if1 decide to appeal I may waive my speedy trial 
rights, but if I decide not to appeal, I don't waive them." Certainly if Livas decided not to appeal 
the issue of any would not come into play. The statement referenced by Judge Copsey is not 
nothing more than a proposition ifLivas decided to file an appeal. In addition, Judge 
Harrigfeld's decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration was issued on April 4, 2007, 
twenty-one days AFTER the six month deadline. Therefore, even if Livas was to decide that he 
would appeal and ask the Magistrate Court to stay the case, the issue was moot because the time 
for speedy trial had already passed. 
With regard to affirming the first "alternative" basis for Judge Reardon's denying the 
motion, Livas did not request the Court vacate the original trial setting - - that decision was made 
sua sponte by Judge Harrigfeld. Livas did not object to the original trial setting nor did he object 
to keeping the original trial setting and proceeding with his Motion td Suppress. 
At no time after Judge Hanigfeld vacated the original trial setting did the State request 
another trial setting or did the Court issue another trial setting. At no time did the Court or the 
State inquire as to whether Livas would waive his right to speedy trial, and at no time did Livas 
waive his right to speedy trial. At all times during this case, Livas has made every effort to move 
the case along expeditiously, including promptly making personal copies of the pleadings for the 
just so he could access them at the juvenile courthouse. 
As set forth above, the duty to bring a defendant to trial lies within the State, not the 
defendant. State v Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, I18 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005). This well 
founded burden was simply overlooked past by both the Magistrate and District Court. The State 
has the burden to come forward as say "this is the State's legal excuse" for not bringing Livas to 
trial. Unless the State can establish legal excuse for a delay under Idaho Code $ 19-3501, the 
case should have be dismissed. 
Instead, the State and the Coufl focus on pointing the finger at Livas - - asserting that ~t is 
Livas' "fault" that the State did not comply with Idaho Code $ 19-3501 because he filed a 
Motion to Suppress - - which motion was filed less than 30 days aiier he entered a not guilty 
plea. 
Certainly the Court cannot entertain the proposition that if a defendant brings a motion to 
suppress (or any pretrial motion for that matter), that defendant effectively waives his right to 
speedy trial; that a defendant opts to exercise his rights under the constitution, he cannot be said 
to havepev se waived another. 
The Magistrate and District Court put the mere idea of pretrial motions in a bad light and 
inappropriate context by holding that "if a defendant does move to suppress or files pretrial 
motions, he cannot use those to delay trial and then assert speedy trial as a sword." (R Voi. I ,  
pg. 0099. All the State had to do was request the Court notice the case for trial, or seek a waiver 
from Livas regarding his statutory right for speedy trial, and the State d ~ d  neither Certainly if a 
defendant insisted on filing pretrial motions and did not waive their right to speedy trial, 
expedited rulings from the Court would be warranted and justified. However, filing such 
motions, without more, cannot alleviate the State's burden. 
Regarding the second "alternative" basis for the respective Courts holdings - that Livas 
did not establish prejudice - that issue should not have been discussed in ruling on +be motion 
because it did not bear on the reason for the delay See Clark, supra The Magistrate and 
Districts both claim that good cause existed for denying the motlon because Livas dld not argue 
that he was prejudiced. The case law is veiy clear that Courts should not loolc to the issue of 
prejudice when and until the State has satisfied its legal excuse for not bringing a defendant to 
trial, which the State did not. Therefore, the issue of prejudice should not have been discussed as 
a Barker factor, or considered by either Court. 
In this caze there exists no substantial reason for the delay that rises to the level of legal 




Judge Reardon erred in holding that because Livas filed a Motion to Suppress, he 
effectively applied to postpone his trial, thereby waiving hls right to speedy trial as provlded in 
Idaho Code § 19-3501, and Judge Copsey erred in affirming that decision . 
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